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ABSTRACT:
Elizabeth Hope Bordeaux: Un-Veiling Islamophobia in the Post-9/11 Era: Orientalism in the
Veil Debate in France and the United States, December 2003 to June 2004
(Under the direction of Don Reid)
This essay explores the role of Orientalism in contemporary Western society through
an analysis of the debate over the Muslim veil or hijab, in public schools in France and the
United States, between December 2003 and June 2004. It focuses on several official
documents, reports and speeches produced by each government, in response to the debate
over hijab, as well as some popular literature which informs official language and opinions.
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INTRODUCTION
On 14 February 2004, thousands of French Muslims took to the streets of Paris
and Lyon to protest the proposed ban of conspicuous religious symbols in the nation’s
public schools. Carrying banners and signs which read, "School is my right, the veil is
my choice, France is my shelter,"1 and “the veil, my choice,” veiled French Muslim
women asserted their own national identities as both French citizens and Muslims. In a
highly symbolic gesture, some female protestors in Lyon wore veils in the blue, white
and red pattern of the drapeau tricolore, France’s national flag.2 The anti-ban
demonstrations and the eventual law of March 2004 that banned “ostentatious” religious
symbols in French public schools were the result of an important social debate
surrounding the role of Muslims in French public life. Subsequently, American
politicians condemned the French legislation, invoking their own idealized version of
American pluralism to question the legitimacy of the veil ban. Following these events, in
early 2004, US Department of Justice intervened on behalf of veiled American Muslim
students, asserting their right to veil in American public schools. During a six month
1 In the original French, the three-line tricolor banner read, “L’ecole c’est mon droit/Le voile…mon
choix/La France c’est mon toit.” See an AFP photo taken 14 February 2004 by Jean-Loup Gautreau,
available at <www.gettyimages.com> (accessed 13 March 2007).
2 Unsigned article,” Thousands Protest Headscarf Ban,” The Associated Press, 14 February 2004. Available
at <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/15/france.headscarves.ap/> (accessed 27 March 2006).
2period from late 2003 to 2004, the Muslim veil or hijab became a renewed subject
of international controversy and legislative action. This study will analyze the
controversy over the Muslim veil, or hijab, in France and the United States through the
framework of Edward W. Said’s Orientalism. Contemporary Islamophobia is Orientalism
in a new form. What Said identified as a “legacy of connections” between the colonial
past and the present is exemplified by the debate over hijab in Western life and
depictions of veiled women in the contemporary West.3
Viewed at a glance, the French and American government’s divergent positions
on the veil in public schools would appear to contradict Said’s thesis of a unified Western
canon of Orientalism. However, deeper textual analysis4 suggests the opposite, that
Orientalism is present in both debates, in differing forms. I argue that an Orientalism
informed reading of the texts produced by the veil debate reveals the continuity of
Orientalism as an ideology in the post-colonial West and shatters the nationalist
arguments put forth by politicians and activists to obscure the Orientalist discourses and
the otherizing of veiled women within the 2003-2004 debate. The terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 are an underlying motif of Orientalist discourses of the veil debate,
providing a tangible motivation for Western fears about Islam and Muslim identity,
whether these fears are articulated openly or not.5 The existence of Orientalism within the
3 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), xi-xxvii.
4
“Contrapuntal reading” or “contrapuntal analysis” is a term used by Edward Said to characterize his
reading of literary texts and their relationship to the real world. That is, he argues that fictional narratives
both reflect popular opinions and help create them. See Said, Culture and Imperialism, xi-xxviii, 16. I
apply the term “contrapuntal” to my own analysis of non-fictional narratives, because I argue that they are
both a reflection of “the real world,” and an attempt to place boundaries on “the real” to create new, i.e.
revisionist histories or narratives.
5 See Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 1-7, for a discussion of the role of absences and haunting in texts,
3veil debate is embodied by the different political and rhetorical techniques that the United
States and France have used to classify and “solve” the “Oriental problem” of the veiled
Muslim woman, by manipulating her identity as an “other,” either by banning the veil or
accepting the veil in certain contexts and denying its legitimacy in other situations, as
American politicians have done. Moreover, the particularly gendered character of
Orientalism is represented in the treatment of veiled Muslim women, who are made to
bear the symbolic weight of Islamic identity within their own communities.
Examining Orientalism
Edward W. Said’s 1978 monograph, Orientalism has come to define the
contemporary study of the Middle East, and indeed, most post-colonial societies. Said
argued that the canon of Middle Eastern studies, then labeled “Orientalism,” had created
and perpetuated a stereotypical view of the Middle East as backwards, despotic and
lacking in civilization. This constructed Orient, he argued, was created as the negative foil
of Western society and usually portrayed with five distinct “dogmas” of Orientalism.6 As
Bryan S. Turner has stated,
“Edward Said’s massive study of Orientalism [exists] as a discourse
of difference in which the apparently neutral Occident/Orient contrast is an
expression of power relationships. Orientalism is a discourse which
represents the exotic, erotic strange Orient as a comprehensible, intelligible
phenomenon within a network of categories, tables and concepts by which
the Orient is simultaneously defined and controlled. To know is to
images and literature as a marker of relationships between power, knowledge and experience. Gordon looks
for “shapes described by absences,” and also analyzes the construction of “the other,” as a negation of
complex personhood in real life.
6 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 1-31.
4subordinate…Orientalism created a typology of characters, organized around
the contrast between the rational Westerner and lazy Oriental.”7
The need to define and control the Orient via hijab is a key feature of discourse
surrounding the veil debate in France and America. I argue that the presentation of the
veiled woman as a victim of masculine despotism is yet another example of the continued
existence of an Orientalist discourse and typology in contemporary Western society,
under its current guise of Islamophobia. Controlling veiled women is a significant aspect
of Orientalism. However, an important feature of 21st-century neo-Orientalism is the
ability of current Orientalists to adapt older typologies and categories to suit
contemporary political goals and power structures. Examining several political texts
produced in the veil debate in France and America for Orientalism and Islamophobia
reminds us of the continuity of Orientalism, and provides a global, rather than nation-
centric, historical analysis of the treatment of Muslims as highly visible minorities in
Western society. Such an analysis has been absent from treatments of the veil debate,
which tend to focus on national issues, like immigration and assimilation.8 Reexamining
Orientalism is also necessary in light of recent skeptical treatments of Orientalism, and
historical scholarship that treats modern Orientalism half-heartedly or inconsistently.9 In
the field of American historiography, recent works on Cold War-era Orientalism have
7 Bryan S. Turner, “Orientalism and the Problem of Civil Society in Islam,” in Orientalism, Islam and
Islamists (Battleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984), 24.
8 Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 1-198. See especially chapter four of Silverman, which
discusses the relationship of racism, immigration and assimilation to the larger veil debate.
9 See Robert Irwin, Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism and its Discontents (Woodstock, NY: Overlook
Press, 2006), for a recent critique of Orientalism. See Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United
States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), as
an example of recent American historiography that discusses Orientalism inconsistently or half-heartedly
within the text.
5identified a tension between classical Orientalism10 and the forms of Orientalism active in
the mid-twentieth-century, which they characterize as “Post-Orientalism.”11 While I
acknowledge the importance of previous studies, in the post 9/11-era, the popular
resurgence of Orientalist discourses in the West deserves recognition and systematic
analysis. The veil debate is an opportune and revealing vehicle for an analysis of
contemporary forms of Orientalism, which are often obscured by nationalist rhetoric or
mistakenly distinguished from Orientalist tradition under the label Islamophobia.12 The
current popularity of Islamophobia represents one adaptation of traditional Orientalism,
into an Islamophobic discourse which appears more “legitimate” than Orientalism
because it ostensibly focuses on religion, rather than race or ethnicity.13 Islamophobia
adapts the main tenets of Orientalism, refocusing them as solely religious, rather than
ethno-religious descriptions, thereby circumventing criticisms of racism or Arab bias.
Unlike traditional Orientalism then, Islamophobia can be defended by its advocates as
acceptable because of acts of terrorism like 9/11. However, in practice, Islamophobia is
applied to the entire Muslim community without distinction, and “hostility towards Islam
10 By “classically” or “traditionally” Orientalist, I mean characteristic or reminiscent of eighteenth and
nineteenth-century Orientalism, that is to say, Orientalism in its most racist and blatantly derogatory form.
11 For “Post-Orientalism”, see Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media and U.S. Interests in the
Middle East, 1945-2000 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), ix-xv, 4-42, and
Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 10-11.
12
“Islamophobic” discourse is usually used in ways identical to Orientalism, therefore, I argue that
Islamophobia is just Orientalism under another name.
13 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Muslims in the European Union:
Discrimination and Islamophobia December 2006, available at
<http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/muslim/Manifestations_EN.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2007), 60-
61. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) report on Islamophobia
identifies eight tenets of Islamophobic discourse. These include the presentation of Islam as a “monolithic
bloc, static and unresponsive to change,” that Islam is “the other” as well as “inferior to the West,”
“barbaric, sexist,” and Islam “is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and
engaged in a clash of civilizations.”
6is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims
from mainstream society.”14
14 Idem. Adherents to Islamophobia, like their Orientalist predecessors, see “Anti-Muslim hostility…as
natural and normal.”
SECTION ONE
France and the Hijab: Universalism as Orientalism?
The veil debate in France is older and more complex than its American
counterpart, did not originate with the 2004 ban on “ostentacious” religious symbols.
“L’Affaire des foulards”15 is usually traced to a 1989 controversy when several Muslim
girls were expelled from their public school in Creil, France, ostensibly because their
veils represented a challenge to the French system of laïcité or secularity within the
public schools and institutions of France.16 However, the French high court, the Conseil
d’État,17 ruled that the presence of veiled students in public schools did not contravene
laïcité. Similar cases occurred in very small numbers in France over the course of the
1990s and veiling was repeatedly affirmed as legally acceptable within the French public
15 This translates as the “affair of the headscarves” in French. The Muslim headscarf is the most common,
and ironically the least “ostentacious,” form of veiling worn in France, compared to the more extensive
forms of hijab, like the burqas and abeyas, worn in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, respectively.
16 See Bernard Stasi, The Stasi Report: The Report of the Committee of Reflection on the Application of the
Principle of Secularity in the Republic, trans. Robert O’Brien (Buffalo, New York: William S. Hein &
Co., Inc., 2005),: vii-xxvii; or Michel Troper, “Religion and Constitutional Rights: French Secularism, or
Laïcité,” Cardoso Law Review 21 (February 2000): 1267-1272, for a discussion of laïcité.
17 Translated, the “Council of State” is the highest administrative authority overseeing civil disputes
between the French state and its citizens, Stasi, Stasi Report, xxv.
8school system.18 Why, then, did the law banning “ostentacious” religious
symbols, i.e. the hijab, need to be passed in the spring of 2004?19
A contrapuntal reading of documents produced by the French government in
2003, and an analysis of the influence of Islamophobic polemical literature on the hijab
issue reveals that controlling and defining the “Orient” within France is the real intent of
French legislation banning the veil. While a variety of national traditions and historical
circumstances inform the veil debate in France, at the heart of the literature on the veil
issue rests a profound distrust of the “Oriental” populations which now make up a large
and newly visible segment of the French population. The political rejection of their
claims to a simultaneously French and Muslim identity articulated through veiling, by
the French government is a symptom of the Orientalist biases still present in
contemporary French society. Limiting the influence of “the other” in French society is
the primary concern of French politicians, intellectuals, and activists, although they
frame their opposition to “the other” by invoking French principles of universalism and
republicanism. Orientalism, then, is the foundation of the national response to veiling in
France.
Reading Stasi: The Production of Knowledge in the Stasi Report
In December 2003, after a lull in media attention, the veil returned to
prominence in the French popular press and political discourse. The 2003 media furor
18 Fawzia Zouari, Le Voile Islamique: Histoire et Actualité, du Coran à L’Affaire du Foulard (Paris: Favre,
2002), 83-86.
19 The use of the term “ostentacious” in the legislation is significant, as it allows students to wear small or
discrete symbols of religious affiliation, such as the Christian cross, or the Jewish Star of David. As a
result, the law is popularly held to discriminate against veiled Muslim women disproportionately.
9surrounded the publication of a governmental commission report, commonly known as
the Stasi Report, which recommended the banning of “ostentacious” religious symbols
in the nation’s public schools. After calling for a reassessment of laïcité 20 by sponsoring
the Stasi Report, then-French President Jacques Chirac embraced the report’s positive
view of French secularism and negative view of Islam and Muslims, particularly the
report’s analysis of Muslim gender relations and the hijab. The document reaffirmed
French ideological traditions of secularism and anti- communautarisme by rejecting
symbols of conspicuous difference in French society, like the veil. Within months of its
publication, the report and Chirac’s embrace of its message led to new legislation which
banned conspicuous religious symbols in French public schools, most notably the hijab.
The rapid transformation of the veil from a contested symbol into an illegal one,
represented how effectively French political discourse was able to define, marginalize,
and finally outlaw hijab in the public schools by portraying veiling as an Oriental
institution, alien and contrary to French values of civilization and gender equality.
On 11 December 2003, The Report of the Commission for Reflection on the
Application of the Principle of Secularity in the Republic was delivered to French
President Jacques Chirac. The Stasi Report was ostensibly written to address the issue of
laïcité in France, by analyzing French legal and historical traditions. However, it
important to acknowledge that the report was sponsored by President Chirac as a
political document and has been well-received across the French political spectrum,
amongst both conservatives and progressives. The most notable sections of the report
20 Laïcité is the principle of secularity that is enforced in French schools; communautarisme is a negative
term, used in France to refer to the breakdown of society into ethnic, religious or other communities. The
closest English equivalent would be “multiculturalism.”
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discuss the so-called educational and institutional conflicts associated with religious and
ethnic identity in France.
Chaired by Bernard Stasi, the official ombudsman or Mediator of the Republic,
the committee was charged in 2003 with resolving the questions surrounding secularity
in France. It is the Stasi Report which officially recommended a ban of “ostentatious”
religious clothing or symbols in public schools.21 The report contained several important
themes, which included redefining the French theory of laïcité, providing a rationale to
exclude hijab from the public sphere, and the portrayal of veiling as an inherently sexist
institution, all of which effectively placed veiling beyond the pale of French civilization.
Examining these themes reveals how the French government applied and redefined
ideologies, like laïcité to delegitimize hijab and veiled women. Moreover, the report’s
analysis of France’s “religion problem” reflected common stereotypes of France’s
Muslim population. These themes and stereotypes are important as they provided the
government with an official rationale for Orientalist policies, which are shrouded in
nationalist language, like that of laicism and universalism, making the true nature of
these policies more difficult to discern and challenge.
Taken at face value, the Stasi Report proposed a return to true French values of
laïcité and universalism, and made the recommendation to ban the veil out of a concern
for the intellectual and personal freedom of veiled Muslim girls as republican citizens.
Moreover, the Muslim headscarf was associated with a rise in religious identification,
which was and is perceived as a threat to French national unity. In France, religious
identity is identified with coercion and oppression, particularly for Muslim women. This
emphasis on the protection of the individual, from religious coercion by individuals,
21 Stasi, Stasi Report, vii-xxvii, 1-20.
11
religious groups, sects, or the state itself, was a primary theme of the report. The
apparatus of the secular state is posited as the protector of the individual from religious
imposition of any kind.22 The Stasi report placed importance on the ability of the
collective French citizenry to interact in a religiously neutral public space. Thus,
secularism was presented as a unifying force in French society, and as an integral part of
French national identity. Developing a French identity within the public education
system was another theme of the Stasi Report. Thus, the ban on “ostentatious” symbols
was justified as an attempt to prevent religious coercion and propaganda within the
public schools, while small symbols were and are allowed as symbols of religious
membership in French schools, according to the official language of the report. 23
However, the report’s justification and analysis of laïcité contained several
interesting features, which indicate that the ban on “ostentacious” religious symbols was
a certain conclusion before the report was even published. In his invocation letter to the
committee, French President Jacques Chirac asked the committee to consider several
questions, which clearly set the anti-veil tone and content of the report. Chirac first
asked the chairman to contemplate, “What measures are likely today to favor calming
implementation of the secularity principle?” Then he continued, “Within the schools of
the Republic, how can full force be given to the requirements of secularity?”24 Given the
substance of the committee’s mission, as articulated by Chirac, it is unsurprising that the
end result was a ban on hijab in schools.
22 Ibid, 19; 20-55.
23 Ibid, 10-20.
24 Ibid, 8.
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The report’s mission effectively created a false causal relationship between
veiling and discord within the French public schools, and by implication, with Islam and
disturbances the French public sphere.25 Secularity was presented as the heroic
combatant against religious influence in an unending battle “marked by violent crises,” a
historical portrayal that is reminiscent of the “clash of civilizations” rhetoric of
contemporary Orientalism.26 Of similar importance was the report’s characterization that
“secularity has formed our collective history,” and the report articulated a vision of
French history derived from the Greeks, Renaissance and the Enlightenment, that wholly
excluded Muslims or Islamic culture from its narrative of intellectual, political and
economic achievements. The report identified laïcité as the “inheritor of Greek
rationalism and the Judeo-Christian tradition,” a description which is loaded with
Orientalist overtones.27 As Said described, the process of defining and subordinating the
Oriental other entails the creation of a bipolar discourse, between Western rationality
and Eastern irrationality. The Stasi Report, then, was a vehicle for the creation and
perpetuation of Orientalist discourse in France. According to the report, only “the most
rational currents” in Islam are compatible with French republicanism.28 As a result,
veiled women in French schools were implicitly characterized as irrational others. The
25 Similarly, some intellectuals in France blamed the 2005 suburban riots following the accidental deaths
of two Muslim youth on Islam. “Islamic radicalism” or “machismo” is often blamed for violence and
crime in France’s banlieues or ghettoes.
26 Stasi, Stasi Report, 16. The term “clash of civilizations” is derived from an article by Samuel
Huntington, which Edward Said criticized in an article entitled, “The Clash of Ignorance” in The Nation
(October 2001), available at <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said> (accessed 9 March 2007).
Said wrote, “‘The Clash of Civilizations’ thesis is a gimmick like ‘The War of the Worlds,’ better for
reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our
time.”
27 Ibid, 17.
28 Ibid, 19.
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significance of the report, then, is that it reinforced Orientalist discourses of power, by
imbuing Western values with a positive character, while Islam was consistently depicted
in less positive terms. The sections of the report that directly address veiling are clearly
Orientalist in tone; for example, the report characterized the wearing of hijab thusly, “the
significance of the Islamic veil is that it stigmatizes ‘the pubescent girl or the woman as
solely responsible for masculine desire,’ a vision that conflicts with the fundamental
principle of equality between men and women.”29 Moreover, the report’s analysis of
French jurisprudence was constructed to exclude veiling from the French school system.
While arguing that the French state must provide “the means of coexistence for
individuals in one place who do not share the same convictions,” the report described
French legal precedent as “scattered.”30 Instead of beginning the discussion of this so-
called “scattered body of law,” by analyzing the legal precedent established in earlier
“les affaires des foulards” in the 1980s and 1990s, which would reaffirm the
compatibility of veiling with laïcism, the Stasi Report looked in another direction
entirely. While the report mentions late nineteenth and early twentieth-century French
laws, for more recent jurisprudence it invokes international law. Here, the report takes
on a surrealist quality, jumping from the 1905 law which separated the French state and
educational system from the Catholic Church, to a recent Turkish law banning an
Islamic political party. The report cited Turkish political precedent, established in the
European Court of Human Rights’ acceptance of the official Turkish governmental
position in Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey of 13 February 2000. The use of this
particular case, which the report called “highly significant” is intriguing, as the modern
29 Ibid, 53.
30 Ibid, 20.
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Turkish state’s relationship to Islam has been a tumultuous one, as embodied by the ban
on the Refah Partisi, an Islamicist party in Turkey.31 The appropriation of Turkish
policy, then, represented a definitive break with previous hijab cases in France, post-
9/11. The unusual nature of this appropriation is explained, not by legal precedent, but
by Orientalist fears about Islam. The implication of the French embrace of Turkish
policy is that French committee members viewed Islam as fundamentally threatening to
French government and society, much as the secular Turkish establishment rejects any
Muslim influence in government. Thus, the report again connotes Islam with instability
and danger, although the report’s authors have to reach out to international, non-French
events to do so. Moreover, this suggests that the Stasi committee was desperately
searching for any legal precedent to ban hijab in the public schools.
Most importantly, the analysis of the Conseil d’État decisions of the 1980s and
1990s in the Stasi Report is an indicator of the French government’s desire to
mischaracterize almost twenty-years of legal veiling in French public schools. While the
Stasi Report stated that in earlier hijab cases, “the context was clearly different from
what it is today,” the report provided no compelling explanation for significant
contextual change from 1989 to 2003 [my italics].32 The use of the term “clearly” here is
ambiguous and misleading; the report’s only stated criticism of earlier Conseil d’État
31 With the establishment of the modern Turkish state after World War I, an authoritarian program of
Europeanization and secularization was undertaken by Kemal Ataturk. Only in 1996 was an openly
Islamicist politician elected to high office in Turkey; subsequently there was a military-driven backlash
against Islamist political parties, culminating in the ban on the Refah Partisi, which the European Court
upheld. See Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 60-61.
32 Stasi, The Stasi Report, 30.
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decisions is that they provided no mention of “the question of discrimination between
men and women.”33
The depiction of Muslim gender relations and veiled women in the Stasi Report
is another significant trope of contemporary Orientalism. Islam and the veil are
characterized as sexist and discriminatory Oriental institutions that are incompatible with
French, i.e. Occidental, and egalitarian values. As a result, the Stasi Report claims that it
is the responsibility of the French state to save veiled Muslim women from masculine
oppression. The Stasi Report’s preoccupation with Muslim female oppression via hijab
echoes the European nineteenth-century fascination with the harem as innately foreign
and tyrannical towards women. The stereotype of the harem woman, known in France as
the odalisque, was a prominent theme of traditional Orientalist34 discourse, in spite of
the discrepancies between reality and European and American fantasies of the harem. In
the Stasi Report, nineteenth-century stereotypes about odalisques as powerless and
sexualized victims are transposed onto contemporary veiled Muslim women. Like their
odalisque predecessors, characterized as imprisoned behind harem walls, French Muslim
women are presented as victims of their male relatives, imprisoned by the demands of
patriarchal society or Muslim misogyny in Stasi. The foremost symbol of female
oppression in this discourse, of course, is the veil. As the report states, “the significance
of the Islamic veil is that it stigmatizes ‘the pubescent girl or the woman as solely
responsible for masculine desire,’ a vision that conflicts with the fundamental principle
of equality between men and women.”35 The report denies the substantive religious
33 Ibid, 30.
34 By “traditional Orientalism,” I mean the Orientalist discourse of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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value of veiling to some Muslim women, for whom the experience of hijab is a solemn
and important sign of their commitment to Islam. The denial of agency and intellectual
autonomy to Muslim women in the Stasi Report, especially veiled women, is a chief
example of 21st-century Orientalism.36
Even French usage of the term “veil” to suggest harem-like exclusion and
women’s oppression oversimplifies the complex significance given to hijab in Arabic,
the Qur’an and feminist interpretations of Islam. In the Qur’an, revelations regarding
male and female dress do not use the term hijab, or refer concretely to forms of female
garb. Instead, Muslim women and men are engendered to dress modestly. In Arabic, the
word hijab has multiple meanings, including “cover, wrap, curtain, veil, screen” and
“partition” and the word hajaba, can signify either the adoption of the veil or an effort to
conceal or partition something.37 The Arabic term “min wara’ al-hijab” or “behind the
hijab,” has been used variously to describe the partition between “good and evil, light
and dark, believers and non-believers, or aristocracy and commoners.”38 Hijab, in its
purest sense does not automatically signify female inequality, but refers to the creation
of a sphere of sanctity and personal privacy. The misinterpretation of hijab contained
within the Stasi Report is not unique to the current veil debate; rather there is an
Orientalist history of mischaracterizing Islam as a stagnant set of inward-looking cultural
35 Stasi, The Stasi Report, 53.
36 See Judith E. Tucker, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 1-199, particularly her chapter on the harem. Also see Reina Lewis, Gendering Orientalism:
Race, Femininity, and Representation (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 127-178. For an analysis of the
harem stereotype in the contemporary West, see Fatima Mernissi, Scheherazade Goes West: Different
Cultures, Different Harems (New York: Washington Square Press, 2001), 1-220.
37 Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance (Oxford, UK and New York: Berg, 1999), 157.
38 Idem. Some Muslim feminists have used this ambiguity to argue that veiling was only prescribed for the
wives of the Prophet Muhammad, rather than all Muslim women. See Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender
in Islam (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
17
values or the enemy of Western civilization. Islam has been categorized by a previous
generation of Orientalists as a “parasitic” or even false religion, and the source of
“failure” within Muslim civilization vis-à-vis Western cultural achievements.39 Past
Orientalist depictions of Islam as static and barbaric are echoed in the Stasi Report’s
analysis of the veil’s impact on Muslim women. As Pruett states, Orientalist portrayals
of Islam ignore Islam’s history as a lived religion that has changed over time, and
denigrate the ideal of “submission to God” which is sacred to billions of Muslims.40
Rather Orientalists have consistently depicted Islam as “a cultural artifact requiring
interpretation by outsiders,” i.e., Westerners.41 Like previous Orientalist discourse, the
Stasi Report denies Muslims in France the intellectual capability to have an “Islamic”
identity and a modern identity simultaneously and claims that veiled women are
“submissive” to man, rather than God. Thus, the call to ban the veil in French public
schools and institute an “acceptable” version of Islam in contemporary France is part of
a long tradition of Orientalism.
The theme of reform and moderation of Islam within the Stasi Report also has
Orientalist implications. Calls for Islamic reform via westernization or increased
secularization have been present within Orientalist discourse for decades, if not
centuries. Given Orientalists’ depictions of Muslims as backward and resistant to
modern society, it is unsurprising that Orientalist discourse portrays Westerners as
responsible for bringing modernity to Muslims. Enlightenment by virtue of European
39 Gordon E. Pruett, “‘Islam’ and Orientalism,” in Orientalism, Islam and Islamists (Battleboro, VT:
Amana Books, 1984), 43.
40 Ibid, 45-64.
41 Ibid, 79.
18
influence is a common trope of Orientalism.42 The Orientalist discourse advocating
reform of Islam from outside, rather than from within, is a primary component of the
Stasi Report. The report characterizes this effort as “the integration of Islam and
Muslims into the major currents of contemporary critical thought,” a description which
again places Islam and Muslims beyond the pale of civilization and contemporary life.43
Exploring all of these Orientalist themes reveals that the Stasi Report is more than an
assimilationist tract about laïcité in France. Stasi represents the continued influence of
Orientalism in French society, and the ability of French officialdom to construct
paradigms of knowledge about “the Orient,” i.e. Muslims, in France. These paradigms
include a hostile portrayal of Islam, a characterization of veiled Muslim women as
oppressed victims of masculine brutality and sexism, and the need for Islam to be
“purged” of these barbaric elements through the benevolent influence of French
civilization, most notably laïcité. The post-9/11 hegemony of this discourse is revealed
by the degree that the Stasi Report rewrites French history vis-à-vis earlier hijab cases in
the 1980s and 1990s. The hegemonic nature of Orientalist discourse in contemporary
France is evident by French President Jacques Chirac’s response to the Stasi Report.
Embracing Stasi: Jacques Chirac Responds
On 17 December 2003, French President Jacques Chirac, delivered a speech in
Paris entitled “On Respecting the Principle of Secularism in the Republic.” Chirac’s
speech was both a legitimization of the Stasi Report and an act of political performance
42 Ibid, 64-88.
43 Stasi, The Stasi Report, 59.
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that relied on Orientalist tropes to reinforce Western hegemony. In answer to the 11
December completion of the Stasi Report, President Chirac articulated a traditional
nationalist vision of France as “an open, hospitable and generous country.”44 Like other
official documents from France, Chirac’s speech is ostensibly preoccupied with the
perceived threat of ethnic division and separation within the Republic. Chirac’s
ideological vision, articulated within the 17 December speech, is of a secular,
enlightened France, united by “history, tradition and culture,” as well as “humanist
principles” of “equality and fraternity among all French people.”45 Chirac asserted a
dichotomous relationship between Republican identity and religion, where religion and
ethnicity have the potential to disrupt the “national community.”46 As a result, he argued
that a secularized national or “French” identity should take precedence over any racial or
religious identity. Much of Jacques Chirac’s political rhetoric echoed the nationalist tone
and analysis of laïcité within the Stasi Report.47
By embracing this view of French identity, Chirac placed himself firmly
alongside commentators who called for a ban on “conspicuous” religious symbols, i.e.
the hijab. By invoking a nationalist view of French history, Chirac reaffirmed the
Orientalist tropes of the Stasi Report about the threat of Islam to Western civilization. In
fact, he claimed that “the danger lies in the release of centrifugal forces, the exalting of
divisive particularisms; in wanting to see rules governing sections of our society take
44Jacques Chirac, Excerpts of a Speech entitled “On Respecting the Principle of Secularism in the
Republic,” delivered in Paris, France on December 17, 2003. Available at
<http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/root/bank/print/2675.htm> (accessed 27 March 2006).
45 Idem.
46 Idem.
47 Idem
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priority over national law.”48 With his significant use of the word “danger” to describe
the supposedly “particular” identity threatening France, Chirac subliminally referred to
an entire canon of Orientalism without ever using the words Islam or Muslim.
Unconsciously or consciously, the French President wedded the Republic to anti-Islamic
Orientalist sentiments, including the presentation of an antithetical contrast between
French Enlightenment and Islamic civilization. Chirac accomplished this by
characterizing the Republic as an ideal place, implicitly foiling49 “French” values with
the supposedly “divisive” and antithetical values of “the other” in France. The
subconscious foiling of Occidental values with unspoken Oriental ones is evident in the
way Chirac describes the threat to La République as nothing less than a spiritual and
physical battle. To give in to Islam would “sacrifice her heritage, compromise her
future” and would “result in the loss of her soul.”50 As a result, Islam and the hijab can
be read as an enemy of French republican values. Chirac’s vision of France inadvertently
reveals the Orientalism of the veil debate. His speech is a presentation of all things non-
French as negative and divisive to France, rather than an acknowledgement of the
positive contribution Muslims could have, or do make, in contemporary French society.
His speech oscillates between an idealized description of republican values and his
rhetoric about a republic “under siege” from the threat posed by minority groups in
France. The tension within his speech is meant to reinforce the quasi-religious purity of
republican values in the face of supposed Oriental defilement. Chirac’s vision of the
48 Idem.
49 By “foil,” I mean, provide an antithetical, contrasting opposite, i.e. “good vs. evil.”
50 Chirac, Secularity, available at <http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/root/bank/print/2675.htm> (accessed 27
March 2006).
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Republic is essentially a call to return to the Republic of 1900, a republic unified by
laïcité, and a homogenized public French culture of whiteness in contrast to the Oriental
“otherness” represented by hijab.
What is the larger significance of the Stasi Report and Jacques Chirac’s
deployment of Orientalism in the veil debate? In the mid-twentieth century, France
experienced a massive influx of immigrants, mainly from the former colonies of Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia.51 These immigrants, usually known as Mahgribiens, were largely
Muslim and working-class and many remain impoverished and socially isolated in the
suburbs, despite decades of residence in France. Their children and grandchildren, Beurs
or Beurettes, are similarly marginalized today. They are legally French citizens, most
identify themselves as French and they have few cultural and emotional ties to North
Africa or the Islamic world. Nonetheless, Beurs are still stigmatized as “others.” The
question of their proper identity and assimilation into French life has dominated the veil
debate. Moreover, life in the suburbs has become associated in the public consciousness
with crime, violence and other modern social problems, roughly comparable to
American notions of urban violence and poverty. Some have claimed that anti-veil
sentiment is among the last socially “respectable” forms of racism in France, comparable
to earlier periods of rampant anti-Semitism, epitomized by the Dreyfus Affair.52 As
51 What role France’s colonial history plays in the veil debate, particularly the long and bloody conflict in
Algeria, deserves fuller study. Certainly the involvement of radical Islamic groups in Algeria had an
impact on French perceptions of Islam and the threat of Islamic terrorism. See October 3, 1958 speech by
French president Charles de Gaulle, available at <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1958degaulle-
algeria1.html> (accessed 27 March 2006). De Gaulle’s articulation of France’s civilizing mission in
Algeria is a nationalist depiction of France, not dissimilar from Jacques Chirac’s evocation of French
identity in 2004.
52 Said Bouamama, “Ethnicisation et construction idéologique d’un bouc émissaire” in Le Foulard
Islamique en Questions, ed. Charlotte Nordmann (Paris: Amsterdam Press, 2004), 37-45, Houia Bouteldja,
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Tricia Danielle Keaton describes, these factors have led to the labeling of French citizens
of Arab and African descent or ethnicity as “suitable enemies” in the popular
discourse.53 Several commentators have accused the French government of anti-
immigrant racism in its veil policy.54 One French Muslim student described the French
policy thusly, “this whole debate is about hiding our problems…this law isn’t
necessary…It’s crazy! They’re not criminals; they’re just trying to go to school!”55
Veiled schoolgirls also have to respond to the negative attitudes of their teachers, who
reject their claims to a simultaneously French and Muslim identity. One teacher rejected
a student’s assertion that she chose to veil, rather than being forced by her parents,
stating, “I find that hard to believe. I believe, all the same, that she is unconsciously
influenced by her upbringing.”56 Despite the fact that this teacher described the same
student as “intelligent, animated and lively in class (sometimes too much),” like French
officials, she denied her students the autonomy to make their own decisions about faith
and identity.57 However, this veiled student described her own decision to veil in a
sophisticated, articulate way: “Personally, I want to veil because I’m Muslim and the
et al. “Une nouvelle affaire Dreyfus,” in Le Foulard Islamique en Questions, ed. Charlotte Nordmann
(Paris: Amsterdam Press, 2004), 47-54.
53 Tricia Danielle Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics and Social
Exclusion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 2.
54 Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 1-198. See especially chapter four of Silverman, which
discusses the relationship of racism, immigration and assimilation to the larger veil debate. See also,
Louisa Larabi Hendaz, Le Voile Humilié ou Les Auditions Manquées de la Commission Stasi (Paris:
Editions Marjane, 2005), 1-319; Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in
France and Germany, trans. Barbara Harshav (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002),1-
11, 38-43, 69-71, 90-113; Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of
Citizenship in France and Britain (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998),1-79, 150-200.
55 Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France, 183.
56 Ibid, 185.
57 Idem.
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Koran requires women to dress this way. But understand that it is forbidden for fathers
to force their daughters to wear the veil, as well as their wives. If a woman wears the
veil, she has to do it because she wants to, herself.”58 Furthermore, she stated, “we can
practice our religion while being totally integrated in France…work, become doctors,
lawyers and school teachers,” albeit, in private schools, because teachers, like students,
cannot veil in public schools in France.59
As Muslims now number 5 million in France, and are the nation’s largest religious
minority, issues like hijab are given increased media attention and veiled Muslims are a
newly visible group within society.60 The social and ideological tensions caused by the
association of Muslims and Islam with poverty and crime in France today are reflected
in the Orientalist discourse of Stasi and Chirac. However, these social tensions have only
increased since the original “L’Affaire des Foulards” in 1989.
Nous Sommes Tous Americains61
The return to Orientalist discourse in post-9/11 France is significant, as it
suggests that international events, like the terrorist attacks in the United States, have
hardened French opinions and policies towards hijab and Muslim visibility in Europe.
58 Ibid, 187.
59 Idem.
60 Stasi, The Stasi Report, vii-xvi.
61 Jean-Marie Colombani, “Nous Sommes Tous Americains” in Le Monde 12 September 2001, English-
language version available at <http://www.worldpress.org/1101we_are_all_americans.htm> (accessed 14
March 2007). The title of Colombani’s editorial translates as “We are all Americans” and expresses the
horror and solidarity with the US felt by many in France after 9/11. Columbani wrote, “This situation
requires that our leaders to rise to the occasion. They must act so that the peoples whom these warmongers
are seeking to win over and are counting on will not fall in step behind their suicidal logic. This we can
say with some dread: Modern technology allows them to go even further. Madness, even under the pretext
of despair, is never a force that can regenerate the world. That is why today we are all Americans.”
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The redefinition of laïcité and new emphasis on assimilationist programs in Stasi that
focus on integrating veiled Muslims, albeit Orientalist in tone and content , are a symbol
of a wider change in French politics and public discourse since the earlier cases
surrounding hijab. The events of 11 September 2001 and the new international visibility
of radical Islam, both inside and outside of France “amplified” previous fears about
Muslim identity in France.62
Fears about veiled women as symbols of a “green peril” or Islamic neo-
fundamentalism have existed in France since 1989; an opinion poll taken in France in
1989 indicated that a majority of French citizens opposed the veil in public schools.63
However, these fears have been amplified and given concrete expression in the events of
9/11 and the American “War on Terror” in Afghanistan. As Stasi committee member
Patrick Weil wrote in 2004, the change in French opinions since 1989 came from an
awareness of increased pressure “in the last two or three years.”64 Although Weil
characterizes this increased pressure as demands on unveiled Muslim girls to adopt the
veil, it is telling that his chronology of change in the veil debate follows 9/11. Moreover,
in a talk given in the United States on 8 May 2003, entitled “Terrorism and
Restrictionism: Their Impact on European Immigration,” Weil asserted that 9/11 caused
European governments to systematically revisit the way they see their immigrant
62 Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France, 2.
63 Zouari, Le Voile Islamique, 83-90. A 1989 poll taken by Le Monde showed that 75% of French citizens
were against hijab, while only 6% were favorable and 17% indifferent. Ironically, most French Muslims
opposed or were indifferent to hijab as well; 45% opposed, 22% were indifferent, while only 30% were
favorable to veiling in the public schools.
64 Patrick Weil, “A Nation in Diversity: France, Muslims and the Headscarf,” on OpenDemocracy.Net (25
February 2004), available at
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/ViewPopUpArticle.jsp?id=5&articleId=1811#> (accessed 11
March 2007).
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populations.65 As a result, 11 September 2001 raised concerns about Islamic radicalism
both internationally, and within France, vis-à-vis the French Muslim community. 9/11
added to French fears about Islam, abetting majority notions of a Republic “under siege”
from Islamic extremism. A 2002 poll showed that a majority of French citizens, 60%
were either “somewhat worried” or “very worried” about Islamic terrorism in France.66
Similarly, a poll taken in late 2002 revealed that 88% of French citizens were afraid of
“international terrorism.”67 Polls taken in France after 2001 and the controversy
surrounding the veil ban68 also reveal an increased concern with Muslim identity in
France. The same poll revealed that many French citizens associated Muslim identity
with the potential for violence.69 Moreover, the 14 July 2005 Pew Research Center poll
showed that the majority of French citizens felt that current Muslim immigrants did not
65 Summary of talk given 8 May 2003 at the Nixon Center, available at
<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Program%20Briefs/PBrief%202003/050803Weil.htm>
(accessed 12 March 2007).
66 The Pew Research Center poll taken 17 April 2002, available through Polling the Nations database.
67 Eurobarometer poll taken in December 2002, available through Polling the Nations database. Of French
respondents, 88% said they were “afraid” of international terrorism, while only 10% said they were “not
afraid.”
68 The Pew Research Center Poll taken in 2005 reveals that public opinion on the issue of hijab in the
public schools is in accordance with the official political rhetoric espoused by each nation in 2003 and
2004. A majority of French citizens, seventy-eight percent, agreed with the decisions of their government.
By contrast a majority of Americans, roughly fifty-seven percent, believe that Muslim women should be
allowed to veil. “French Agree with Headscarves Ban,” Associated Press (July 15 2005) available at
<http://euro-islam.info/pages/news_france_07-15-05.html> (accessed 27 March 2006).
69 The Pew Research Center poll taken 14 July 2005, available through Polling the Nations database. This
poll contained several questions, including “In your opinion, these days do you think there is a growing
sense of Islamic identity among Muslims in our country or don’t you think so?” In France, 70% of
respondents said yes. In a follow-up question in the same poll, these respondents were asked “Do you
think this a good thing or a bad thing for our country?” 89% replied that it was a bad thing, while only 9%
said it was a good thing. Another question was asked of the same group, “which of the following worries
you the most about Islamic identity in our country today?” The poll listed three options: 1. “it can lead to
violence” 2. “it can lead to a loss of personal freedom” or 3. “it will prevent Muslims from integrating into
our society.” 50% of the French respondents agreed that it could “lead to violence,” while only 25% were
concerned with the prevention of integration and 25% with loss of freedom.
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want to adopt French customs and ways.70 These fears about terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism have increased markedly since a 1995 poll, which showed that only
41% of French citizens felt that acts of terrorism were “a major threat” to themselves and
the people around them.71
The rise in international attention given to terrorism since 2001 is also paralleled
by a rise in polemical literature about Islam,72 driven by the need to classify and gain
“knowledge” about Islam and the Orient, so as to fight terrorism. The phenomenon of
Islamophobic literature is transnational and not unique to France, so French anti-veil
polemic can be understood as a subgenre of Islamophobic literature.73 Current
Islamophobia is just Orientalism in a post-9/11 guise. As Said wrote in October 2001,
70 Idem. 59% agreed that Muslim immigrants “want to be distinct” when asked “Do you think most
Muslims coming to our country today want to adopt French customs and way of life or do you think they
want to be distinct from the larger French society?” The same poll series revealed that, of those in France
who believe some religions have the potential for violence, that Islam was considered the most violent by
87% of respondents; Judaism, Hinduism and Christianity all received 2% in the same poll, respectively.
71 The Gallup Organization Inc., Yomiuri Shimbun, poll taken 30 April 1995, available through Polling
the Nations database.
72 See Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library,
2003). Lewis is generally depicted as Edward Said’s bête noir and as the embodiment of continued
Orientalism in American literature. Other American authors usually labeled “Orientalist” include Martin
Kramer, Robert Spencer, and Daniel Pipes. Notable French and European authors who embrace versions
of the “clash of civilizations” argument are Gilles Kepel, author of several books in English and French,
including Jihad: Expansion et Déclin de l'Islamisme, 2nd ed., (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), and Fitna: Guerre
au Coeur de l’Islam (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), and Les Banlieues de l’Islam: Naissance d’une Religion en
France, 2nd ed. (Paris: Le Seuil, 1991); the latter work, “The Suburbs of Islam” argued that French
Muslims in the banlieues were culturally and socially isolated, and in effect, French banlieues were
becoming “suburbs” of the Middle East, or ansars within France. Similarly, Oriana Falluci’s La Rabbia e
l’Orgoglio (Milan: Rizzoli, 2001) argued that Muslims, the embodiment of abhorrent values and practices,
are “colonizing” Europe and threaten to destroy all the cultural and social achievements of the European
Enlightenment. These various European works all connect the increased visibility of hijab with Muslim
terrorism and sexism.
73 See Fadela Amara with Sylvia Zappi. Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2003), 1-50
and Michèle Vianès, Un Voile sur La République (Paris: Éditions Stock, 2004), 1-160. Both women have
written widely publicized books which argue that maintaining laïcité (secularism) is essential if the
democratic nature of French society is to survive and that the resurgence of radical Islam embodied by the
veil, in their view, is a threat to French civilization. Amara, a secular Frenchwoman of Algerian descent
equates fundamentalist Islam to “green fascism,” while Vianès calls Islam “Theo-terrorism” and compares
veiled Muslim women who refuse to secularize and unveil to schizophrenics.
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use of the “clash of civilizations” thesis, which he labeled the “clash of ignorance,” in
contemporary discourse reproduces Orientalist typologies of knowledge74 about Islam
and Muslims vis-à-vis the West. These popular discourses, and they fears they represent,
are responsible for reviving many of the traditional Orientalist tropes in the veil debate
today and creating the political environment that led to the veil ban. While 11 September
2001 is never mentioned directly in the Stasi Report and Jacques Chirac’s 17 December
2003 speech, the terrible specter of terrorism has revived Orientalism, and Orientalist
views of hijab in France. The near-hegemony of Orientalist discourse in France is
evident in French Muslim women’s efforts to resist Orientalist stereotypes or present
alternative viewpoints.
Other Voices, Other Muslims
“And it is clear for me today that the headscarf represents the political symbol that we must fight at all
costs if we want to avoid falling back into obscurantism.”—Fadela Amara, 200675
One notable political figure is Fadela Amara, whose work epitomizes the
fractured and sometimes inconsistent nature of resistance to Orientalist discourses in
France. Amara is an example of a Muslim Frenchwoman with a “double-consciousness,”
as Tricia Danielle Keaton described, who distances herself from the veil because of its
74 Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, available at
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said>. Whether this “knowledge” is historically accurate is
irrelevant, as the building of Orientalist foils, i.e. “bad” Islam and “good” West helps to make sense of a
“disorderly” and complicated universe of overlapping connections and interaction, by defining and
maintaining narratives of irreducible difference.
75 Fadela Amara with Sylvia Zappi, Breaking the Silence: French Women’s Voices from the Ghetto, trans.,
with an introduction by Helen Harden Chenut (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
2006), 159.
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negative associations in larger French society.76 Her organization Ni Putes Ni Soumises77
is one of few political groups led by a French Muslim woman of North African descent.
Ni Putes Ni Soumises is an advocacy organization for impoverished and marginalized
Muslim girls and women in the banlieues, intended to counterbalance stereotypes of
Muslim womanhood by asserting that they are “Neither Whores or Submissives.” Her
activities and media savvy have made Amara internationally known, and articles about
Ni Putes Ni Soumises are typically glowing, describing her as heroic figure fighting the
oppression of women. TIME Europe named her one of its “Heroes” of 2004. Her
movement is also very popular, and she claims to have ten thousand members of Ni
Putes Ni Soumises in chapters across France.78 However, Amara’s articulation of the
plight of Muslim women in France is a reflection of her identity as a cultural hybrid, and
her own sense of what it means to be a Muslim and French republican. While she does
accuse the French government of abandoning both men and women in the suburbs, her
bête-noir is the male-oriented, gang culture of Muslim young men in the banlieues. She
embraces the secular policies of the French Republic, embodied in the Stasi Report,
arguing in 2006 that the veil ban was necessary.79 Amara’s perspective on the veil is not
uncommon in French feminist and republican circles, and she is in some ways the ideal
76 Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France, 3.
77 The name of the organization, as well as Amara’s book, translates as “Neither whores nor Submissives.”
78 Bruce Crowley, “Acting on the Outrage,” TIME Europe (October 11 2004): page numbers unknown.
Available online at http://www.time.com/time/europe/hero2004/amura.html; accessed 24 January 2007.
79 Idem. Intriguingly, Amara’s perspective on the veil ban has changed over time; she wrote in the original
French version of Ni Putes Ni Soumises that a ban threatened the hard-won autonomy of some veiled
Beurettes to go to school or interact in wider society or would only stigmatize Muslims, rather than
integrating them. However, by the 2006 edition of Breaking the Silence, Amara had a change of heart,
explaining that the veil ban was “more necessary” than she had previously imagined and hoping that, once
un-veiled, Muslim women would join the “feminist avant-garde.”79
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secular Muslim woman that the French state would like to create, as outlined in the Stasi
Report. In fact, Amara was among those interviewed by the Stasi Commission, and has
asserted that, “the veil is the visible symbol of the subjugation of women,” as well as
“archaic.”80
In fact, Amara only minimally acknowledges that a Muslim woman in France
could choose to veil for positive or devotional reasons.81 Instead, she highlights the more
radical view of veiled women as either victims or “soldiers of green fascism.”82 Her
public statements describe hijab as a wholly sexist and discriminatory institution.83 A
prominent theme within Amara’s writings is the sexualized nature of abuse towards
Muslim women by their brothers or male contemporaries, who, she argues, have forced
women to adopt the veil for protection. She attributes problems in the banlieues to a
traditional patriarchal culture warped by modern misogyny: “Daughters, sisters, cousins,
female neighbors must either act like submissive but virtuous vassals, or be treated like
cheap whores. Any sign of independence or femininity is viewed as a challenge and
provocation."84 She argues that Muslim youths commit sexualized atrocities like rape
and violent assault or murder of women as a result of the profound social insecurity
created by life in the suburbs and that hijab is a symbol of the rising influence of so-
80 Rose George, “Ghetto Warrior,” The Guardian UK (July 17 2006): page numbers unknown. Available
online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/women/story/0,,1822296,00.html; accessed 24 January 2007.
81 Amara, Breaking the Silence, 73-75.
82 Idem.
83Amara with Zappi. Ni Putes Ni Soumises, 1-50.
84 Bruce Crowley, “Acting on the Outrage,” TIME Europe (October 11 2004): page numbers unknown.
Available online at http://www.time.com/time/europe/hero2004/amura.html; accessed 24 January 2007
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called “basement Islam.”85 In response to criticism86 that she depicted Muslim youths in
the banlieues as “thugs” and “gang-rapists,” she asserted that her depiction “was true in
2003 and 2004.”87 Amara’s vivid descriptions of male misconduct against powerless and
subjugated women echoes the nineteenth-century Orientalist fascination with Eastern
despotism and brutality, as exemplified in the European translations of The Arabian
Nights or other lurid tales.88 Moreover, she depicts the banlieues and housing projects as
social prisons much like earlier writers depicted the harem as a prison. While Amara
does humanize secular victims of violence in the banlieues, like Souhanne Benziane;
veiled women, like their male counterparts, are a nameless and dehumanized mass of
“green fascist[s].” 89
85 Amara, Breaking the Silence, 93-102. Amara is right to criticize violence direct towards women, but she
is intolerant towards any group that does not share her views, including women in the banlieues who adopt
the so-called macho behaviors and clothing of men, as well as veiled women. She rejects any woman who
resists her own, very Eurocentric, view of femininity and female desirability, which seems to consist of the
“right” to lipstick and skirts. See Amara, Breaking the Silence, 7-77.
86 In the translator’s introduction to the English version of Amara’s work, retitled Breaking the Silence,
translator Helen Harden Chenut acknowledges this, stating: “the movement and its leader must counter
charges that their actions and high media coverage further stigmatize Muslim men of their own
community. Other critics note that the suburban violence they describe is a much more pervasive
phenomenon that affects populations of other nationalities, religions and races.” Amara, Breaking the
Silence, 3.
87 Rose George, “Ghetto Warrior,” The Guardian UK (July 17 2006): page numbers unknown. Available
online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/women/story/0,,1822296,00.html; accessed 24 January 2007.
88 See Lady Hester Lucy Stanhope, Travels of Lady Hester Stanhope (Salzburg, Austria: Institut für
Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Universität, 1983), 280-296. Lady Stanhope recounts the tale of a pasha,
Ahmed el-Gezzar, who violently beheaded fifteen of his wives when he discovered their infidelity.
89 Rose George, “Ghetto Warrior,” The Guardian (July 17 2006): page numbers unknown. Available
online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/women/story/0,,1822296,00.html; accessed 24 January 2007.
Interestingly, the circumstances of Souhanne Benziane’s death are reported in various ways; George’s
article describes her death as the result of a dispute between Souhane’s boyfriend and a 22-year-old gang-
member, or caid, Jamal Derrar, who was later sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Derrar, known as
“Nono” reportedly burned Souhanne to death as revenge on her boyfriend. While Amara connects
Souhane’s tragic death to her secular identity and “vivacious” personality, other accounts describe a
retributive cycle of violence, which has no specifically Muslim connotations, and is more suggestive of the
worldwide growth of gang rivalries and drug-related violence.
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However, Amara rejects the Orientalist “clash of civilization” views espoused by
figures like Oriana Fallaci and openly laments the post 9/11 resurgence of hostility
towards Muslims and Islamic civilization as a whole. While she affirms the contributions
of Islamic civilization to art, poetry and the science, she states her own preference for the
“red cap” of the French revolution over the hijab.90 Amara’s personal identity is a
reflection of the cross-cultural interaction that is often obscured by the Orientalist
rhetoric of the veil debate. She is a living embodiment of Said’s criticism of the failure
of Orientalist rhetoric to explain “in reality, the interconnectedness of innumerable lives,
‘ours’ as well as ‘theirs.’ ”91 Nonetheless, there is reason to fear that Amara’s critique of
hijab and strong opinions about masculine brutality in the suburbs will be invoked to
undermine criticism of Orientalist initiatives, like the ban on the veil. The media
reception of Amara’s critiques in the post-9/11 world indicates that her calls for
reinvestment in the suburbs have been overshadowed by the attention given to her lurid
descriptions of male banlieue rage against women.92 Despite her efforts, Amara has had
limited success in providing an alternative viewpoint that reveals the complex nature of
the lives of Muslim women and men in France.
As a result, the law banning “ostentatious” religious symbols was passed by the
National Assembly on February 10th 2004 by a large majority, with four hundred and
ninety-four votes for the proposed law, and only thirty-six against.93 This law was
90 Amara, Breaking the Silence, 100-102.
91 Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, available at
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said>.
92 Rose George, “Ghetto Warrior”; Bruce Crowley, “Acting on the Outrage.”
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quickly confirmed by the French Senate on March 15th 2004. While French legislators
and commentators framed their discussion of the veil in nationalist terms, like laïcité, or
equality, and made reference to the continuity and integrity of the Republic, their
discussion hinged on Orientalism in crucial ways. Following the events of 9/11 and the
resurgence of Orientalism in the form of Islamophobia globally, both the Stasi Report
and Chirac were able to depict Islam as wholly incompatible with true French identity.
In so doing, these French commentators simultaneously created and reinforced
Orientalist stereotypes of Islam as static, sexist and uncivilized. Despite politicians’
insistence that the Republic is the ideal welcoming space for all its’ citizens, it appears
that the post-9/11 Republic is closed to Islam and Muslims in certain respects, which are
both historically significant and highly conspicuous.
93 Assemblée Nationale, 2ème Séance du Mardi 10 Février 2004, Application du Principe de laïcité dans
les écoles, colleges, et lycées publics, available at <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cra/2003-
2004/156.asp#P128_35234> (accessed 27 March 2006).
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SECTION TWO
American Orientalism: Rejecting Laïcité in Pursuit of Global
Hegemony?
American politicians were quick to respond negatively to the events in France in
2003 and early 2004. On 11 February 2004 the day after the anti-veil law was passed by
the French National Assembly, the United States House of Representatives passed a
resolution which condemned the French ban. American Congressmen and women
directly opposed French interpretations of laïcité, arguing that “equating any immediately
visible expression of faith with proselytism or propaganda misrepresents the nature of
such practices and distorts the public understanding of religious devotion.”94
According to official American interpretations of the French ban, “state control
over personal expressions of faith runs counter to the free exercise of religion, the
freedom of speech, and separation of church and state, and threatens mutual toleration of
religions and between religious groups and governments.”95 Thus, the US Congress
called “upon the government of France to respect the right of religious individuals to
practice freely their religion and to display insignia of the their faith,” and recommended
that “the United States Government urge the Government of France to reassess this
initiative in light of its international obligations to ensure that every person in France is
94 House of Representatives, United States Congress, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives
that France should modify or abandon its ban on religious articles and symbols in state schools and
respect the freedom of all to practice their religious faith without state interference. 108th Cong., 2nd sess.,
H.R. 528 (February 11 2004). Available at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c108:./~c108rl138th>
(accessed 27 March 2006). 
 
95 Idem.
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guaranteed the freedom to manifest his or her religion or belief in public.”96 The United
States Ambassador for Religious Freedom, John Hanford, exemplified American thought
on the veil ban and French theories of laïcité, when he was quoted, “Where people are
wearing these with no provocation simply as a manifestation of their own heartfelt
beliefs, we don’t see where this causes divisions among people.”97 While his statement
encapsulated the official American political position on the veil, the reality of veiling in
American political life is more complex, affected by American conceptions of Islam as
well as American notions of religious freedom.
To begin, the issue of veiling has never been as politicized in the United States, as
it has in France.98 This is despite recent events, such as 11 September 2001, which have
drawn more American media attention, some of it negative, to the hijab.99 Why then, did
American politicians criticize the French law? The chief differences between French and
American criticisms of veiling are related to national geopolitics. Like French
commentators and politicians, American politicians rely on gendered notions of
Orientalism to further their political goals; in the US case, those goals are linked to a
desire to create global American military hegemony, while the gendered nature of French
96 Idem.
97
“US Concern over French Scarf Ban,” BBC News 19 December 2003. Available online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3333741.stm; accessed 27 March 2006.
98 The lack of attention given to veiling in the US explains the disparity in length between the US and
French sections of this essay.
99 Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled, 1-88. While the veil does carry a variety of cultural associations within the
United States, these associations are largely cultural, rather than nationalist. Indeed, American film,
television and other media have treated the veil as a symbolic object, to sell consumer goods, sex and to
designate Muslim cultures as “exotic” and “other.” For more on this subject, see Edward Said, Orientalism.
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 1-31 or Said’s Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts
Determine How We See the Rest of the Word (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 1-200.
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Orientalism is invoked to legitimize republican national goals.100 American political
support for the veil in US public schools does not reflect an absence of Orientalism
within American society. In fact, Islamophobia is equally popular in the United States
and France. 101 As in France, American politicians still “practice” Orientalism, just in
different political contexts. Instead of associating the veil with a large population of
impoverished and potentially riotous immigrants or marginalized citizens, the veil has a
variety of historical connotations in the United States. As described by Faegheh Shirazi,
the veil is used in American erotica, as a symbol of mystery and sexual availability, and
in male-centered advertising of consumer products to suggest masculinity and
desirability. Likewise, images of veiled women in advertising directed towards American
women emphasize the comparative freedom of women in the United States vis-à-vis their
Middle Eastern counterparts.102 The veil in American culture, then, is largely symbolic of
an otherness and exoticism which is more distant, both politically and territorially, than in
the French case.
100Prepared Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, “The Department of Justice’s Efforts to Combat
Terrorism,” United States Senate Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 June 2004. Available at,
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2004/060804agsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm> (accessed 27
January 2007).
101 See Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library,
2003). Lewis is generally depicted as Edward Said’s bête noir and as the embodiment of continued
Orientalism in American literature. Popular American literature on Islam and Muslims has been
characterized by tensions and uncertainty about the compatibility of “Islamic” values and democracy and
the ability of Muslim societies to adopt American cultural values, particularly regarding women.
102 Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled, 10-38. Shirazi discusses an SUV advertisement, where a veiled woman is
portrayed as attracted to a Western man driving a Jeep. She also discusses a Virginia Slims advertisement,
directed towards American women, where a turbaned man and his multiple wives are contrasted with the
pandering slogan, “You’ve come a long way, baby,” which is meant to suggest the comparative
emancipation of American women.
36
Cold War Precursors
While the American media continually replicates traditional Orientalist
stereotypes,103 over the past fifty years, the American government has embarked on a
more ambitious and complicated relationship with the Islamic world. During the Cold
War, cultural historian Melani McAlister argues that American policies could be
characterized as “Post-Orientalist” in their attempts to persuade Muslims to join in the
fight against Communism, despite policymakers’ largely negative and Orientalist views
of Islam.104 Some historians have attributed the transition in American culture from
traditional nineteenth-century style Orientalism to “Post-Orientalism,” as the result of key
developments in the post-WW II era. These included American anti-Nazi propaganda,
which rejected Nazi notions of racial purity, and embraced Franz Boas’ less rigid theories
of “cultural difference” and ethnic, religious and racial pluralism.105 An idealized image
of American pluralism and freedom was then invoked to support US anti-Communist
efforts.106 These efforts included increased involvement in the Middle East during the
Cold War. However, “Post-Orientalism” is notable for it’s retention of some stereotypes
and continued “otherization” of political enemies, despite the ostensibly liberal
tendencies of policymakers and commentators from mid-century onwards. As Douglas
Little argues in American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since
103 See Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest
of the Word (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 1-200.
104 McAlister, Epic Encounters, ix-xv.
105 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 10-11.
106 Idem; For discussions of Cold War propaganda centering on racial equality in the US, see Mary L.
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000), Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-
Colonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
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1945, Despite their general distrust of Islam and Muslims, American policymakers were
forced to deal with the Middle East and Islam, because of the need for oil and their desire
to establish an anti-Communist sphere of influence in the region.107
As described by Matthew F. Jacobs, policymakers’ interest in the Middle East
was framed in an international context, which explicitly contrasted Western modernity
with Islamic backwardness. 108 Encouraging modernity, policymakers argued, might keep
the region from falling under Communist sway. In the 1950s, contributors to Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Policy Bulletin, described the Middle East as a region in transition,
divided between those who embraced modernity and those who adhered to “medieval”
fundamentalist Islam.109 Among the latter was the “sinister mufti” of Jerusalem, who
served as the “arch villain” of the Mideast for mid-century America, much like Osama
bin Laden or the Iraqi Shi’ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr in contemporary US media.110
Orientalism has remained a consistent part of American rhetoric vis-à-vis foreign policy
opponents for the last fifty years. These Orientalist tendencies, under the moniker
Islamophobia, would come to play a role in the veil debate.
The US and Hijab: Domestic Pluralism and International Orientalism
In fact, US political rhetoric on hijab has a bipolar character consistent with
previous trends in foreign policy. American officials vacillate between a depiction of
107 Little’s argument is supported by Melani McAlister’s study of representations of the Mideast in
American culture, Epic Encounters, ix-xv, 4-42. Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States
and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002),1-200.
108 Matthew F. Jacobs, “The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in
the Early Cold War,” Diplomatic History 30 no. 4 (September 2006): 705-739.
109 Ibid, 713.
110 Ibid, 722.
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Islam and American veiled women as another example of the ideal pluralism of
American society, and Orientalist rhetoric about the threat of Islamic neo-
fundamentalism. Fears about Islam and forced veiling, framed in Orientalist terminology,
are projected outward away from the US and characterized as a problem for non-
American Muslim women, such as those forced to veil by the Taliban in Afghanistan or
the Islamic Republic of Iran. These classifications are largely driven by political
necessity, as seen in the contrast between American politicians “concerns” for Iranian or
Afghani women, while the marginalization of Saudi women is given much less attention
in official discourse. This fascination with forced veiling by non-American women is
seen in the popularity of literature on this subject, such as Azar Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in
Tehran. The so-called “subversive”111 nature of Nafisi’s work is epitomized by the
doctored image of veiled women on its’ cover.112 By contrast, veiled American Muslims
are not as stridently objectified or construed as oppressed in American political rhetoric.
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush quickly
asserted that public observations of Muslim faith, including veiling, by American
Muslims were both an American right and a statement of American identity. On 26
September 2001, in a meeting with Muslim leaders, he tellingly remarked that his aim
111 By subversive, I mean the Orientalist argument that Nafisi subverts Iranian tyranny and oppression of
women.
112 See Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books (New York: Random House, 2003),
which some have criticized as an apologia for the Bush administration’s foreign policy, with its ideological
blend of American neo-conservatism and Orientalism; Nafisi thanks Bernard Lewis in her notes and the
publicly surrounding her book focuses on her depiction of Iranian women as totally oppressed, with the veil
as the prime symbol of that oppression. The book cover is an alteration of a photograph of two young
Iranian women reading a reformist newspaper; the cover art crops the newspaper out, creating the
implication that the young women are reading Lolita instead, with great interest and fascination. Critics
argue that her depiction denies Iranian women agency in the pursuit of legitimizing American imperialism
and that it denigrates all aspects of Iranian culture. For a critique of Nafisi, see an editorial by Columbia
University professor Hamid Dabashi, “Native Enformers and the Making of American Empire,” in Al-
Ahram Weekly (June 2006): no. 797, available online at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/797/special.htm;
accessed on 2 March 2007.
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was to “make sure that everybody who is an American is respected” [my italics].113 The
rights of veiled women would be protected by his administration, because protection of
minority rights was an essentially “American” privilege and responsibility. At a meeting
held at the Islamic Center on 17 September 2001, Bush stated: “Women who cover their
heads in this country must feel comfortable going outside their homes. Moms who wear
cover must be not intimidated in America.” 114 Significantly, the President never used the
word hijab to describe veiling; instead he used the term “cover” which has no specifically
Muslim associations and is much more neutral. By identifying Muslim women as
“Moms,” Bush also distanced American Muslims from any Orientalist stereotypes. In
essence, his speech negated any “otherness” that might be attached to American veiled
women. He connected hijab to American nationalism, stating that intimidation of veiled
Muslim citizens was antithetical to American values, claiming “that's not the America I
know. That's not the America I value.” 115 Bush’s articulation of American values was
highly nationalist, and importantly, he constructed his argument in highly personal terms.
His strong self-identification with veiled Americans, epitomized by his use of “I” in the
previous quotes, was aimed at legitimizing Muslim Americans. Reflecting on the fears of
some veiled women, he stated, “I've been told that some fear to leave [home]…they're
afraid they'll be intimidated. That should not and that will not stand in America.” 116 He
continued, “This is a great country. It's a great country because we share the same values
113 George W. Bush, Remarks to Muslim Community Leaders on 26 September 2001, available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/bushremarks.html> (accessed 14 March 2007).
114 George W. Bush, Untitled Speech at the Islamic Center on 17 September 2001, available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/bushremarks.html> (accessed 27 March 2006).
115 Idem.
116 Idem.
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of respect and dignity and human worth. And it is my honor to be meeting with [Muslim]
leaders who feel just the same way I do…They love America just as much as I do.”117 By
portraying veiled Muslim-Americans as “Moms” who are patriotic and Muslims who
“love” America, the Bush administration asserts a very different view of hijab in the
United States. The veil is humanized and legitimized as a part of US culture, by
becoming Americanized. This transformation of the veil into “safe” symbol within the
United States became a dominant theme of American discourse on the veil debate.
However, Bush’s speech depicted Al-Qaeda as wholly antithetical to American
values, and American Muslims, as well as to Islam itself. He stated, “I have told the
nation…that ours is a war against evil, against extremists, that the teachings of Islam are
the teachings of peace and good, and the al Qaeda organization is not an organization of
good, an organization of peace. It's an organization based upon hate and evil.”118 His
embrace of American Muslims was accompanied by rhetoric that distanced American
Islam from the Islamic neo-fundamentalism of Al-Qaeda and America’s enemies. He
stated, “I'm proud of the Muslim leaders across America who have risen up and who have
not only insisted that America be strong, but that America keep the values intact that have
made us so unique and different.”119 Bush utilized America’s benevolent “difference” and
exceptionalism as a foil to the “hatred” and “evil” of extremism, epitomized by Al-
Qaeda. In claiming that all Americans, including Muslims, were united behind a strong
America, he legitimized his characterization of US foreign policy as a war against the
117 Idem.
118 Bush, Remarks on 26 September 2001.
119 Idem.
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irreducible other, a “war against evil.” Moreover, he asserted Muslim American support
for US foreign policy against “the other” represented by Al-Qaeda. Like his French
counterpart, Jacques Chirac, Bush declared that his nation’s values were essentially
utopian, and that he was a champion of ideal national values against the destructive
efforts of Islamic neo-fundamentalism. However, the crucial distinction between the two
leaders was that American discourses accepted the identities of American Muslims as
long as they proclaimed their “love” for America, and were of the same opinion as the
President, i.e. “appalled and outraged” by 9/11.120 By embracing and differentiating
American Muslims, including veiled women, from Muslims worldwide, American
politicians were able to “otherize” Muslim terrorists without alienating the American
Muslim population. With this sleight-of-hand, American Orientalism was applied
selectively, to the US’ political enemies who happened to be Muslim,121 rather than to all
American Muslims. As a result, American Orientalist rhetoric was used to justify
American foreign policy after 9/11. The repercussions of 9/11 and US political rhetoric
aimed at legitimizing American Muslims are evident in the US response to the veil debate
in France.
American Orientalism, 9/11 and its relationship to the veil debate in the United
States are epitomized by the legal case of Nashala Hearn. Her case is reflective of the role
of political necessity in shaping American Orientalism. Hearn, an eleven year-old
Muslim student in the Muskogee, Oklahoma public school system, was suspended in
2003 because, it was asserted by her school, her hijab violated school dress codes. After
120 Bush, Speech on 17 September 2001.
121 By contrast, Muslims who were not “appalled and outraged,” regardless of their nationality were
subsequently treated as “otherized” Muslims and political enemies, as can be seen in their internments at
Guantanamo Bay and other places.
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Hearn sued the Muskogee public school system in October 2003 in response to her
suspension, the United States Department of Justice interceded on her behalf in March of
2004.The so-called Muskogee Memorandum, issued on behalf of Nashala Hearn by the
Department of Justice on 6 May 2004, argued that the Muskogee public school system
violated Hearn’s right to equal protection under the law. The Department of Justice also
asserted that Hearn was discriminated against by her school system.122 Their
memorandum further argued that Hearn had worn her hijab for several weeks from
August to September of 2003, with the full knowledge of her teacher and school
principal, and without any major disciplinary action or disruptive incidents. Only on 11
September 2003, the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks was Hearn approached by
her homeroom teacher, Diane Walker, who told her that her hijab violated the school
dress code and reported her to the school principal. The school district argued that
Hearn’s headscarf violated the dress code’s regulations concerning disruptive or gang-
related items, and that Hearn’s hijab “frightened” or “concerned” other students.
Moreover, the school district argued that 1998 Department of Education guidelines
regarding religious expression in the public schools required them to ensure the neutrality
of the classroom. The validity of these assertions was flatly rejected by the Department of
Justice. The Department of Justice memorandum strongly condemned the actions of the
122 United States Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division. United States Memorandum of Law in
Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgement (May 6 2004) by Sheldon Sperling. Available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/religdisc/musk_memo.htm> (accessed 27 March 2006). The memorandum filed
by the Justice Department pinpointed several key factors in the Hearn case, most importantly that the
selective and arbitrary nature of dress code enforcement in Muskogee violated Hearn’s right to be treated
equally by the school system, under the Equal Protection Clause. The Memorandum bluntly stated:
“Defendants must show that their conduct toward Nashala advances interests of the highest order and is
narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. They cannot do so. [Their] rationales are not compelling;
indeed they are so lacking in factual support that they would not even meet the minimal requirement of
rational basis scrutiny.”
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school district as a violation of American law, stating that the “undisputed facts show that
Defendants' actions were not neutral toward religion, but rather singled out Nashala based
on her Muslim faith.”123
Following the intervention of the Justice Department, the Hearn case was quickly
resolved on 19 May 2004. Both the Department of Justice and the school district agreed
to resolve the conflict, in effect settling Hearn’s case, through the filing of a consent
decree. The Muskogee School System agreed with the demands of the Department of
Justice to revise their dress code policy. Hearn was now legally allowed to wear her hijab
in her public school.124 In a press release for the Hearn case, Acosta stated, "No student
should be forced to choose between following her faith and enjoying the benefits of a
public education. We certainly respect local school systems' authority to set dress
standards…but such rules cannot come at the cost of constitutional liberties. Religious
discrimination has no place in American schools."125
In creating this press release and strictly enforcing the Justice Department’s
Muslim anti-discrimination effort, Acosta transformed a case about American Muslim
women and their veils into a symbol of American beneficence. The US Senators and
speakers commenting on Hearn’s case at an 8 June 2004 Senate hearing on religious
freedom also framed her win in terms of American pluralism and in the context of the
123 Idem.
124 United States District Court, Consent Decree of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma, in Eyvine Hearn et al. v. Muskogee Public School District 020; et al.(May 2004) by Frank H.
Seay, United States District Judge. Available online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/religdisc/hearn_consent_decree_final.pdf; accessed 27 March 2006.
125 Acosta, Press Release dated March 30th, 2004, available online via, http://usinfo.state.gov; accessed 27
March 2006.
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larger French veil debate.126 Dr. Melissa Rogers, a visiting professor at the Divinity
School of Wake Forest University, who was invited to speak at the hearing, condemned
the actions of the Muskogee Public School System as a “mistake.” Invoking the legal
decisions in France, she continued:
“The First Amendment gets it right. It prohibits the government from
promoting religion, but protects the people’s right to do so. This is not the
French rule. You know, there was talk earlier [in the hearing] about some
effort perhaps in America to cleanse the public square of religion. France, I
think, is arguably headed in that direction….That is cleansing the public
square of religion. We do not have that rule.” 127
Understanding interpretations of American religious pluralism applied the veil
debate in the US, is as crucial as understanding how laïcité works in French discourse. In
contrast to the French model, American models of identity stress the individual, rather
than the collective. Moreover, American ideology embraces the concepts of individual
freedom and religious pluralism. American interpretations of church and state separation
have provided the United States with an entirely different view of religion in public life.
This ideological foundation is highly significant, if we are to understand American
acceptance of veiling in public schools and condemnation of the French position.
American concepts of separation of church and state are characterized by adherence to a
philosophy of “negative freedom,” or the freedom of individuals from overzealous
interference by the state. Drawn from an English Enlightenment tradition which includes
the writings of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and others, American notions of freedom
126 United States Congress, Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Constitution, Civil Rights and
Property Rights, Beyond the Pledge of Allegiance: Hostility to Religious Expression in the Public Square.
108th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 June 2004. Available via Lexis-Nexis Congressional at <http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/congcomp/doclist?_m=82415ab27c87f1e1ef95b82946989360&wchp=dGL
bVtz-zSkSA&_md5=8b6b9480d67f34a857c1da3922d5b99d> (accessed 27 March 2006).
127 Ibid.
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are centered on the rights of the individual. These philosophical differences of
interpretation explain the Congressional condemnation of the French ban in February
2004.128 The defense of veiling as an essential right or freedom is associated in American
political thought with the defense of all religions, not just Islam. As a result of these
ideologies, many of the problematic ‘threats’ posed by Muslim identity in France, are not
present in the American political discourse on the veil. Only when the veil is framed in
terms of America’s foreign policy goals, does Orientalism play a role in the discussion of
veiled women.
Although the legal and political rhetoric surrounding Hearn was discussed in
nationalist terms her case had international repercussions. The presence of 9/11 as an
underlying motif within her case is indicative of Hearn’s role as a symbolic figure in
several discourses; her case was used to subtly rebuke the French, and glorify American
nationalism and foreign policy initiatives. Subsequently, Nashala Hearn, her veil and the
idea of 9/11 were invoked as a foil for the evils of terrorism, as opposed to American
goodness.129 Hearn’s case is in contrast with American treatment of veiled Muslims in
international contexts, as described by US Attorney General John Ashcroft.
On 8 June 2004, the same day Nashala Hearn was the keynote speaker in a Senate
Judiciary hearing on religious freedom, then US Attorney General John Ashcroft spoke to
the Senate Judiciary Committee in a separate hearing about his department’s efforts to
combat terrorism. His speech exemplifies the tension inherent in America’s relationship
to Muslims and Islam, and the contextual acceptance of Islam in the US, as practiced by
128 Cohen, Freedom’s Moment, 1-3; 4-21.
129 Idem. In his introduction of Hearn, who was the keynote speaker, Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX)
characterized her case as an example of increased legal hostility towards religion, which he further
characterized as anti-American and an attack on “this brave young girl’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”
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freedom-loving American Muslims. He described the war on terror as “a mortal struggle
between two visions for human life in a war that can know only one victor.”130 Like
President Bush, he utilized utopian narratives of the United States to authenticate policy,
claiming, “Our vision is a vision of freedom, human dignity and tolerance for every
citizen.”131 Moreover, Ashcroft explicitly connected Hearn’s case with the international
war on terror, stating: “Let me give you an example of this nation’s dedication to that
vision. Nashala Hearn is a brave 12-year-old Muslim girl…. On September 11, 2003
school officials forbad her to wear the hijab, or headscarf, that is an expression of her
religious faith.”132
Ashcroft described his office’s activities in her case as an effort to “protect”
Nashala, humanizing her as a “quiet sixth-grader who likes reading” and telling his
Senate audience that her “favorite subject is world cultures” and “someday she wants to
write children’s books.”133 Effectively, Ashcroft constructs a narrative of innocence and
purity around Nashala, by reminding his audience of her non-threatening and distinctly
American identity. By describing her with these soft, feminine qualities of quietness, a
love of reading and children’s books, Ashcroft appeals to American notions of gender
and childhood, both of which are antithetical to evil and hatred, the qualities ascribed to
Muslim extremists in American political discourse. Moreover, he fundamentally
130 Prepared Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, “The Department of Justice’s Efforts to
Combat Terrorism,” United States Senate Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 June 2004.
Available online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2004/060804agsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm; accessed 27
January 2007.
131 Idem.
132 Idem.
133 Idem.
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separates her “Muslim-ness” from that of terrorists by appealing to American ideals of
religious freedom and shared cultural values.
After establishing Nashala and the American government as heroic figures,
Ashcroft turned his attention to geopolitics and “the War on Terror.” He described the
Bush administration’s foreign policy efforts as “the war we are fighting is a war for
Nashala and all freedom-loving people everywhere. We continue to strive, after two
centuries, to build that city upon a hill—a nation that values the religious liberty of a
single young girl and the constitutional liberties of all its citizens.” Historicizing the “War
on Terror” as part of America’s attempts to create an idyllic nation-state, Ashcroft
condemned America’s enemies as the antithesis of all the good America had tried to
produce. He employed an Orientalist construction of us-versus-them in his call to the
Senate and the public to support American foreign policy. He stated, “contrast [our]
ideals with the dark ambition of our enemies,” and invoked typically Islamophobic and
Orientalist visions of male despotism and tyranny in his description of the enemy. “In the
nightmare vision of the Taliban and al-Qaeda,” he argued, “little girls like Nashala are
denied their rights.” Employing the tropes of gendered Orientalism, Ashcroft described
what Nashala’s life would be like, if she were not American: “As a woman, she could not
go to school. She could not appear in public without a man from her family to speak for
her. She would never be allowed to vote, but she could be whipped.”134 He claimed that,
“to our enemies, a 12-year-old American girl is just another target for their attacks. But in
134 Idem.
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the United States of America…Nashala’s life is so precious that her cause commands the
attention of the government.”135
Ashcroft’s speech mirrors the 2001 statement by George W. Bush in several
ways; first, he humanizes Islam and the veil in his discussion of Nashala Hearn, who is
variously described as “brave,” “quiet,” and “precious.”136 Moreover, her innocence and
idealism are epitomized by his description of her interests and goals, which are
quintessentially American and non-threatening. Finally, her admirable qualities are
transferred to all Americans; she, like them, is merely a “target” to America’s enemies,
indistinguishable from any other American, despite her Muslim faith. As a result of this
Americanization, her veil is not a symbol of terror or oppression, but “freedom of
expression.”137 However, Ashcroft explicitly connects Hearn’s case with the larger
political goals of the Bush administration. He contrasts the aims of American foreign
policy, winning the war for “freedom, human dignity and tolerance” with the “dark
ambitions” of America’s enemies, Islamic fundamentalists and their potential affect on
innocent Americans, like Hearn. Ashcroft’s speech perfectly captures the dynamics of
contemporary Orientalism in the United States. In contrast to the presentation of veiling
by American women as a benevolent act of religious freedom, America’s enemies, the
Taliban and Islamic neo-fundamentalists are depicted as tyrants who use the veil to
oppress women.
135 Prepared Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, “The Department of Justice’s Efforts to
Combat Terrorism,” United States Senate Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 June 2004.
Available online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2004/060804agsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm; accessed 27
January 2007.
136 Idem.
137 Idem.
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Thus, veiling by American Muslims is accepted within the institutions of American
political life, because of its’ relationship to long-held nationalist concepts of religious
freedom and national political goals, while American mass media, culture and foreign
policy portray other Muslim cultures and nations in an explicitly Orientalist manner. By
portraying Hearn’s identity as quintessentially American, any “otherized” or potentially
“frightening” aspects of her identity were negated; indeed the discrimination faced by
Hearn, committed by her own teachers, was reframed within the American debate, not as
Orientalism, but as a failure to live up to American values.138 While Hearn’s school
officials responded to her veil with discomfort or alarm, most likely because they
associated visible symbols of Islam with terrorism, American politicians and officials
utilized her veil to discuss the essential righteousness of the American system even in the
post-9/11 era.
138 United States Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division. United States Memorandum of Law in
Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgement (May 6 2004) by Sheldon Sperling. Available online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/religdisc/musk_memo.htm;accessed 27 March 2006.
CONCLUSION
As Seen Through the Veil
As a result, the American government stands firmly behind the rhetoric of the Hearn
case. Similarly, French officials have maintained their commitment to the ban on
conspicuous religious symbols in the French public school system. While France and
America take divergent positions on the veil, the political statements within the international
debate reflect the influence of Orientalism, Islamophobia and power dynamics in both
societies. As a Pew Research Center Poll taken in 2005 reveals, public opinion on the issue
of hijab in the public schools is in accordance with the official political rhetoric espoused by
each nation in 2003 and 2004. A majority of French citizens, seventy-eight percent, agreed
with the decision of their government to ban the veil in public schools. By contrast a majority
of Americans, roughly fifty-seven percent, believe that Muslim women should be allowed to
veil in school.139 The cohesion of American public sentiment, even in a post-9/11 world, on
the right of Muslims to wear religious clothing is a strong statement of collective American
notions of national identity and religious freedom. French notions of laïcité and national
identity remain equally strong, despite internal and external criticism of French policy. As a
result of the increased visibility of Islam and Muslims throughout the world, these French
and American ideas about the Islamic headscarf will continue to be highly significant.
139
“French Agree with Headscarves Ban,” Associated Press.
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However, it is worth noting that the number of veiled women in France is actually quite
small. Moreover, the connection between veiling and Islamic radicalism has been
exaggerated by the media and politicians in France. Arguing that the wearing of hijab in
the French school system contradicted legal provisions for the equality of the sexes,
French Senators François Autain, Jean-Yves Auxterir, and Paul Loridant characterized
the need for the law as a result of “an unprecedented rise of communautarisme, racism
and anti-Semitism in France at this moment.”140 The accuracy of that statement is
belied by the aftermath of the veil ban in France. Since September of 2004, when the law
went into effect, more than 600 acts of non-compliance have reportedly taken place.
However, only a handful of students have been expelled for refusing to negotiate with
the government. As of October 2004, only seventy-two students were involved in a
dispute over religious clothes or items with their government, in the entirety of
France.141 Moreover, when several French reporters were kidnapped in Iraq in 2004, by
counterinsurgents who demanded that the French government rescind the veil ban,
French Muslims rallied behind their government, not the Iraqi terrorists.142 Despite the
fears of the government and non-Muslim French citizens, Muslims in France today are
proclaiming their desire to be both Muslim and French. As one French Muslim girl told
Tricia Danielle Keaton in 2001, “I want to be like a French girl---not exactly like a
140 Sénat, Loi no. 2004-228 du 15 Mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appurtenance religieuse dans les écoles, colleges et lycées publics
(J.O. no.65 17 March 2004). Available at <http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl02-288.html> (accessed 27 March
2006).
141 Unsigned Article, “France Expels Four from School Over Head Scarves,” Associated Press (October
20th 2004), available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6284615> (accessed 27 March 2006).
142 Unsigned Article, “Hostages Plead: Lift Headscarf Ban” (31 August 2004) available at <
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/08/30/france.hostages.villepin/index.html > (accessed 17
March 2007).
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French girl, but I want to be free to do what I want.”143 By proclaiming her difference in
terms of her personal freedom, this schoolgirl articulated her own identity as a French
Muslim
143 Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France, 157.
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